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TASK FORCE ON BUDGET AND 
ACCOUNTING — HOOVER COMMISSION
By CHRISTIAN E. JARCHOW, Executive Vice President, 
International Harvester Company
You will probably recall that there have 
been two Hoover Commissions, and I think 
it might be well to review briefly the accom­
plishments of each of these.
The first Commission began its work in 
September 1947 and made its final report 
in May 1949. Its authority was limited to 
recommendations for the reorganization of 
departments and agencies. It made 273 
recommendations, and some 196 of these 
were wholly or partially adopted by either 
executive or congressional action. 11 recom­
mendations became obsolete or of dimin­
ished importance with the passing of time. 
This left 66 which were not acted on and 
many of them were referred to the second 
Hoover Commission for consideration.
The second Commission was authorized 
by Congress in July 1953. It made its final 
report at the end of June 1955. Its author­
ity was enlarged to include recommenda­
tions on questions of policy. This commis­
sion appointed 19 Task Forces to carry on 
its studies.
At its peak, the Commission and the 
various Task Forces engaged a total of 525 
full-time and part-time personnel. Many of 
these served without compensation. These 
Task Forces studied some 60 governmental 
departments and agencies, which represent 
about 95% of the expenditures in the Execu­
tive Department.
As a result of the studies by these Task 
Forces, the second Hoover Commission 
made 362 recommendations. Of these, 50 
were of a character which might be sub­
mitted as Presidential Reorganization Plans 
to the Congress under the Reorganization 
Act of 1949, or which might be implemented 
by presidential executive order. A second 
group of recommendations totaling 145 
were within the authority of the various 
departments and agencies to adopt if they 
wished. The third group of 167 recom­
mendations were of a character that would 
require legislation.
The primary purpose of the Commission 
was to recommend methods by which sav­
ings could be made in federal expenditures. 
Thirteen of the Task Forces estimated 
savings. Five others said that savings were 
possible, but stated no amount. A grand 
total of the indicated savings would be 
more than $8 billion, but this is obviously 
an overstatement, since some of the esti­
mates overlap. However, there was no doubt 
in the minds of the commissioners that the 
possible savings should be enough to balance 
the budget and in addition bring about a 
reduction in federal taxes. None of these 
savings contemplated a reduction in present 
defense programs, the elimination of useful 
public works, or a contraction of education, 
health and welfare programs.
In addition to these savings, the Com­
mission pointed out that there are possi­
bilities for recovering federal capital now 
invested in certain agencies which could be 
sold to private enterprises, such as the 
Federal Housing Administration, Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal Nation­
al Mortgage Association, Rural Electrifica­
tion Administration, etc. Such recoveries 
might exceed $10 billion.
TASK FORCE ON BUDGET
AND ACCOUNTING
The Task Force with which I am most 
familiar is that on Budget and Accounting, 
of which I was a member. The chairman 
of this Task Force was J. Harold Stewart, 
head of a public accounting firm in Boston 
and formerly president of the American 
Institute of Accountants. The other mem­
bers were: Dudley E. Brown, Financial 
Vice President, Lockheed Aircraft Corpora­
tion; H. E. Humphreys, Jr., President and 
Chairman of the Board, U.S. Rubber Com­
pany; Christian E. Jarchow, Executive 
Vice President, International Harvester 
Company; Gwilyn A. Price, President, 
Westinghouse Electric Corp.; Kenneth C. 
Tiffany, Vice President, Burroughs Adding 
Machine Company; and J. David Wright, 
President, Thompson Products, Inc.
Our first meeting was with Mr. Hoover 
two days before Christmas 1953. Subse­
quent meetings were held in Washington, 
Chicago and New York.
Our Task Force engaged two full-time 
staff directors and a number of consultants.
We presented 31 recommendations (later 
consolidated to 25) for improvements in 
budgeting or accounting. We estimated 
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that the introduction of these improvements 
would result in an annual saving of at least 
$4 billion or 8½ per cent of the controllable 
budget expenditures.
I shall not attempt to review each of 
the 31 recommendations, but will comment 
on a few of them.
First, let us talk a bit about the budget 
itself. It contains over 1,200 pages of de­
tailed information—about the size of the 
Chicago telephone directory. In addition, 
schedules of personnel positions are in­
cluded as a separate appendix to the docu­
ment.
The budget is presented in great detail. 
There are many items of only $1,000 each. 
While some progress has been made in 
program budgeting, there still remains 
much to be done to indicate broad programs 
and objectives.
The preparation of the budget begins, 
in some agencies, eighteen months prior to 
the beginning of the fiscal year to which 
the budget relates. The lengthy cycle re­
quired for development and enactment of 
the budget is a basic defect in the govern­
ment’s budget processes and tends to make 
the budget out of date before it goes into 
effect.
The Task Force on Budget and Account­
ing recommended that the length of time 
required for developing budget estimates 
should be reduced, both in the agencies and 
in the Budget Bureau. We also recommend­
ed that agency budgets be presented in 
more simplified and concise form and be 
better supported by factual information in 
order that the staffs of the Congressional 
Committees be able to complete their re­
views in shorter time.
The federal budget is essentially a “cash” 
budget and is prepared on the basis of the 
estimated “obligations” to be incurred dur­
ing the budget year.
The budget fails to take into account 
inventories and other working capital avail­
able at the beginning of the year which 
may be consumed in the programs of the 
budget year. Neither does it reflect working 
capital which may become available during 
the budget year and which will be carried 
over to a subsequent year.
Under present procedures there is no 
effective control over expenditures either 
by the Congress or in the Executive Branch. 
This loss of control is attributable to several 
factors which can be summarized as follows:
Appropriations are enacted in terms of 
the obligational authority required to 
carry out approved programs, some of 
which relate to long lead time programs.
There is a tendency in Executive 
agencies to state the obligations incurred 
at the highest possible figures since this 
action strengthens the budget requests 
for the following year.
The obligation basis of appropriations 
produces an incentive in the agencies to 
use all available obligational authority 
prior to the date when it otherwise would 
lapse for obligating purposes. Such action 
tends to support agency budget requests 
for the following fiscal year.
As a result of this procedure, there is a 
substantial amount of unexpended appro­
priations carried forward annually into the 
following year:
Amount 
(In Billions) brought forward
into the year 
1950 ............................. .....  $11.5
1951 ....... ...... ...... ...... ...... 14.1
1952 ........... ............. .......... 50.3
1953 .................. ................ 68.8
1954 .......................... ........ 78.4
1955 ...... ........... ...... .......... 68.0
1956 (estimated) ..... ....... 53.9
This carryover of unobligated authority 
for multiple year programs arises from the 
practice of making full budget provision 
at the outset for such programs, which 
funds remain available until expended.
There has been no effective post review 
of such appropriations by either the Bureau 
of the Budget or the Congress. The pro­
cedure has been to review in minute detail 
a new program for the budget year under 
consideration with little consideration of 
past performance. This inadequacy applies 
particularly to military procurement.
As a means of controlling government 
expenditures more directly and effectively 
we proposed that the present budget, which 
is in terms of obligational authority, be 
replaced by an annual expenditure budget.
Under an annual expenditure budget an 
agency would submit initially a properly 
described program showing the total funds 
required for its completion, projected in 
terms of years. The Congress, if it ap­
proved the program, would enact an annual 
appropriation for the estimated expendi­
tures required for the year under consid­
eration. In addition, the Congress would 
give the agencies contracting authority for 
the amount required during the first year 
for forward contracting beyond the budget 
year. The Executive Branch and the Con­
gress thereafter would review the program 
annually from the standpoint of costs and 
accomplishments, both completed and pro­
jected, and grant additional authority.
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For example, let us assume that the Navy 
is asking for legislative approval to con­
struct a ship. The work is to be accom­
plished over a four-year period at a total 
estimated cost of $150 million, of which 
$20 million is to be spent in the first year.
The Department of the Navy, under the 
plan proposed, would furnish complete in­
formation regarding the entire project. 
They would ask for an appropriation of 
(say) $20 million for the current budget 
year, to cover goods and services to be re­
ceived during the first year, they would re­
quest authority to make contracts for long 
lead items, and they would show the esti­
mated costs to be covered by future ap­
propriations.
Congress would pass an annual appro­
priation on a “goods and services received” 
basis of $20 million to cover the first year’s 
estimate. In addition, the Congress would 
grant contracting authority in the amount 
needed for long lead time items. This would 
provide authority for the Navy to proceed 
with the work and enter into forward con­
tracts.
In its annual appropriation request for 
the second year the Navy Department would 
submit experience data showing how con­
struction is proceeding, together with 
latest cost information. The Department 
might request an annual appropriation of, 
say, $50 million, their estimate of goods 
and services to be received in the second 
year. However, because of a lower priority 
given to Naval construction in that budget 
year and a decision to stretch out the proj­
ect, the Congress might reduce the Depart­
ment’s request for the second year’s appro­
priation to $35 million.
Under present practice an appropriation 
for the entire $150 million would be made 
at the outset. Except as the Congress might 
rescind a previous authority, it has lost 
control over the rate of construction and 
expenditures.
We believe that adoption of the proposal 
for an annual expenditure budget would 
permit more effective control over govern­
ment expenditures. It is recognized that 
adoption of this proposal will require ad­
ministrative changes in the government’s 
budgeting and accounting procedures, par­
ticularly in the Department of Defense.
There is another situation which leaves 
Congress little control of the budget. This 
arises when Congress enacts legislation for 
undertakings which leave the appropria­
tions committees little discretion as to the 
amounts to be appropriated.
For example, in fiscal year 1955 there 
were major programs aggregating $15.3 
billion or 24% of the total budget; which 
were relatively uncontrollable. This in­
cluded $6.6 billion for interest which, of 
course, is based on the size of the debt and 
the applicable interest rates; $3.5 billion 
for veteran compensation, pensions, and 
benefit programs; $2.2 billion for agricul­
ture price support; $1.4 billion for grants 
to states for public assistance; and $0.6 
billion for Federal-aid highway grants; and 
approximately $1.0 billion for nine other 
programs of like character.
Generally, this type of basis legislation 
either commits the Federal Government to 
specified expenditures or prescribes for­
mulae which automatically determine the 
amounts of the appropriations required. 
Agricultural legislation, for example, re­
quires that prices shall be supported at 
certain levels, which in turn depends upon 
the state of the markets for agricultural 
products. Legislation granting funds to the 
states for public welfare assistance pre­
scribes the rates at which assistance shall 
be provided to claimants, and appropriations 
are governed by the number of claimants. 
Similarly, veterans legislation establishes 
rates for readjustment allowances, and 
expenditures under such programs depend 
upon the number of qualifying veterans.
Through the enactment of such authoriz­
ing legislation which involves commitments, 
the Congress has diluted effective control 
over an important area of government 
spending. Therefore, the burden of making 
adjustments in budget expenditures tends 
to fall upon the more controllable programs.
We recommend that whenever legislation 
was passed committing the government to 
continuing expenditures for special pro­
grams which are not susceptible to the 
usual budgetary control, it be enacted for 
a limited term in order to obtain periodic 
Congressional review of its usefulness. Also, 
that the Bureau of the Budget keep such 
programs under continuing review, and the 
President’s budget contemplate amend­
ments to them when their operation con­
flicts with current budgetary policy.
Let’s discuss another situation regarding 
government expenditures. When Congress 
passes appropriations and grants the funds 
needed, the responsibility for budget execu­
tion lies within the agencies and the Bureau 
of the Budget.
The Bureau’s control over appropriated 
funds is based upon a system of agency 
financial reports. It operates primarily 
through the apportionment of funds, the 
establishment of reserves, review and ap­
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proval of agency regulations governing 
control of funds, analysis of audit reports, 
and such specialized measures as regulations 
designed to discourage excessive year-end 
purchasing (“June buying”).
The rate at which appropriations may be 
obligated by the agencies is regulated by 
apportionment of obligational authority 
(usually on a quarterly basis) after con­
sideration of agencies’ requests. These ap­
portionments are further subdivided by the 
agencies into allotments to their organiza­
tional subdivisions. Depending upon the 
complexity of an agency’s organization, the 
allotments are further divided and sub­
allotted to lower levels. This results in a 
multitude of pockets of obligational author­
ity, and each allotment constitutes a ceil­
ing of expenditures which cannot be ex­
ceeded.
In the Department of Defense, it is im­
possible to obtain readily a reliable estimate 
of the number of allocations, allotments, 
suballotments and administrative subdivi­
sions of allotments which are in active use 
and for which accounts are kept. At a mini­
mum there were over a hundred thousand 
in that department alone.
There was a tendency in the government 
to attempt management control through 
this device of controlling funds. The allot­
ment system in itself does not usually pro­
vide management with the financial in­
formation required for measuring the 
efficiency and economy with which funds 
are used. Actually, the allotment system 
places emphasis on the ability to live with­
in allotments rather than the usual man­
agement criterion of performance in terms 
of cost. Another defect in the allotment sys­
tem is the inherent incentive to spend all 
allotted funds in order to support succeed­
ing allotment requests. A more positive ap­
proach is needed under which an appraisal 
of both good and poor performance can be 
brought to light.
This system of multiple allotments cre­
ates another condition. Under the Anti­
Deficiency Act, whenever an allotment is 
exceeded the agency must render an imme­
diate report to the President, through the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and 
to the Congress.
This necessitated the reporting to the 
President and the Congress of a large num­
ber of technical violations where administra­
tive divisions and subdivisions of allot­
ments have been exceeded. These violations 
are attributable to the unnecessarily com­
plicated and detailed allotment structure.
Now for another phase of this problem.
Officers responsible for the disbursement of 
funds are personally liable to the govern­
ment for proper performance of their finan­
cial duties. This personal liability attaches 
to any violations of statutes, even though 
they be unintentional and even though the 
officer himself did not make the mistake 
which resulted in the violation.
Therefore, accountable officers frequently 
seek advice as to the application of laws to 
the facts in a particular case in which he 
is called upon to make a payment. The nat­
ural tendency is for them, in self-protection, 
to request an advance decision from the 
General Accounting Office with respect to 
any case in which they have the slightest 
question as to the legality of a payment. 
They are, in consequence, overcautious in 
the performance of their duties. As an ex­
ample, the Claims Division of the General 
Accounting Office received about 29,000 
vouchers under open appropriations from 
the military’s accountable officers during 
fiscal year 1954, which, according to a GAO 
analysis, did not involve any doubtful or 
complex matters.
It is unduly harsh to hold an officer 
liable where he has acted in good faith and 
shown reasonable diligence. Moreover, the 
expense involved in investigating and dis­
posing of exceptions involving alleged vio­
lations is not warranted.
We, therefore, recommended that account­
able officers be relieved of financial liability 
except where losses resulted from their 
gross negligence or fraud.  
In the field of governmental accounting 
there is much to be done. The systems used 
in some departments are antiquated by in­
dustrial standards. Accounting in the Fed­
eral Government is still mainly concerned 
with cash transactions and has not kept 
pace with the needs of management arising 
from increasing complexity of government 
operations. There is a great deal of dupli­
cation in record keeping. For example, the 
Treasury Department maintained about 
7,000 detailed accounts which duplicated in 
large measure similar records maintained 
in other agencies.
In 1950 Congress passed the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act which provided, 
among other things, that . . . “The Comp­
troller General of the United States, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director 
of the Bureau of the Budget conduct a con­
tinuous program for the improvement of ac­
counting and financial reporting in the 
Government.”
While a means of coordination was thus 
provided, there was in fact no central guid­
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ance or control in the Executive Branch 
over accounting performance.
The essence of the problem as we saw it, 
was what form of organization is needed to 
bring about improvements in government 
accounting and where should it be placed, 
preferably without setting up a new 
agency ?
This function did not belong in the Treas­
ury Department where there is enough to 
be done in fiscal accounts without assuming 
responsibility for central direction of ac­
counting in all other agencies. Neither did 
it belong in the General Accounting Office. 
The Comptroller General is the auditor and 
critic of the accounting and financial man­
agement of the Executive agencies. The 
General Accounting Office is an independent 
agency in Legislative Branch of the Gov­
ernment, having wide powers of examina­
tion and reporting directly to the Congress. 
This independence should not be diluted. 
The Comptroller General should not be di­
rectly involved in the administration of the 
Executive agencies.
The logical place for this function, we 
felt, was in the Bureau of the Budget. The 
Bureau had four principal staff offices, each 
under an Assistant Director, namely:
Office of Budget Review
Office of Legislative Reference
Office of Statistical Standards
Office of Management and Organization
In order to meet his accounting respon­
sibilities we proposed that there be estab­
lished under the Director of the Budget a 
fifth staff office headed by an Assistant 
Director for Accounting and that such of­
fice be named “Office of Accounting”.
This Assistant Director for Accounting 
should be an accountant well qualified by 
training and experience to perform this 
function. He should have ability and repu­
tation such as will gain respect and enlist 
cooperation throughout the Executive agen­
cies.
His duties should be:
1. To develop an overall plan for account­
ing and reporting for all of the de­
partments and agencies, consistent 
with broad policies and standards pre­
scribed by the Comptroller General.
2. To assist in the introduction of mod­
ern accounting methods in the Execu­
tive agencies.
3. To set reasonable but definite time 
schedules for performance and to 
watch progress.
4. To stimulate the building of compe­
tent accounting and auditing organi­
zations in the Executive agencies and 
to assist actively in the selection, 
training and retention of capable per­
sonnel.
5. To report at least annually to the Di­
rector of the Bureau with respect to 
the status of accounting in each of the 
Executive agencies.
The performance of these duties would 
require him to maintain close cooperation 
with the General Accounting Office and the 
Treasury Department in the development of 
Government accounting problems. It would 
also require him to maintain a small but 
select staff of well-qualified assistants to 
operate with the various Executive agen­
cies.
In this connection, our Task Force also 
recommended the appointment of a com­
petent comptroller in each of the important 
departments and agencies.
Under our concept of comptrollership, 
he would occupy an advisory role in man­
agement. While he would not make manage­
ment decisions, the comptroller should be 
invaluable as an adviser and interpreter to 
management. As a result of his intimate 
knowledge of the financial facts, the comp­
troller can assist management in reaching 
sound decisions.
We recommended 'that the comptroller 
should be directly responsible to the head 
of the agency in order to assure indepen­
dence and objectivity in the performance 
of his duty. He should also be responsible 
to the Assistant Director for Accounting in 
the Bureau of the Budget for the observ­
ance of the standards and policies laid down 
by him. He should be a principal officer 
whose duties are, as they would be in pri­
vate industry:
1. To set up adequate accounting and 
auditing systems.
2. To recruit, train and develop qualified 
accounting personnel.
3. To point out opportunities for econ­
omies.
4. To furnish reliable financial reports 
for the management of the agency, 
for Congress, and for other Executive 
departments.
5. To interpret and advise upon signi­
ficant aspects of the financial reports.
6. To direct the preparation and execu­
tion of budgets in the agency.
Agency accounting has been limited in 
most cases to accounting for cash expendi­
tures. We recommended that modern ac­
counting systems be installed and main­
tained on the accrual basis. Such systems 
should permit the preparation of periodical 
financial statements for each agency show­
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ing what it owns and what it owes, as well 
as the current costs of the various opera­
tions within it.
While it would always be necessary to 
account for expenditures of appropriated 
funds, a system of accrual accounting would 
also make possible a record of the dollar 
value of inventories, of real estate and 
other property, as well as their applica­
tion to costs.
Until all of the departments have ade­
quate accounting systems under competent 
supervision, it will not be possible to know 
the real costs of operating the Federal 
Government or to prepare reliable combined 
reports for the entire government showing 
the accrued receipts and expenditures of 
the Federal Government, the fixed assets 
owned by it (real estate, buildings, equip­
ment, etc.), the inventories and other work­
ing capital of the government, as well as 
the obligations payable by the government. 
In other words, if we expect to produce the 
kind of financial statements which every 
modern business institution must have, we 
felt it would be necessary to modernize the 
government accounting systems so as to 
know the accrued revenues and costs, as 
well as assets and liabilities of the Federal 
Government.
As for the saving of $4 billion set out 
in our report, it is not possible to pinpoint 
this saving and indicate in detail where it 
may be accomplished. Necessarily, much 
of it must come in the Department of De­
fense, but we did not contemplate any re­
duction in the defense program. The sav­
ing can be brought about by better methods, 
better control, elimination of duplication in 
effort, reduction of excessive stocks of goods, 
greater efficiency and better organization.
So much for the work of our Task Force 
on Budget and Accounting. You are nat­
urally interested in what has happened 
since our report was presented in June 
1955.
A great deal has been accomplished since 
then—some by legislation, some by execu­
tive order, and some by voluntary adoption 
by the agencies.
The legislation passed included, among 
other things, the adoption of accrual ac­
counting, but it did not provide for the 
adoption of accrual expenditure appropria­
tion procedure. President Eisenhower has 
announced that he will recommend to the 
next Congress additional legislation to ac­
complish this further step.
A new staff office of accounting under the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget has 
been set up, headed by an assistant Director 
for Accounting. It is under the direction of 
Percy Rappaport, formerly in public ac­
counting for many years, and a very able 
person. He and his staff are hard at work 
and have already brought about worthwhile 
improvements.
Meanwhile many of the agencies have 
selected competent comptrollers and prog­
ress is being made there as well.
A few months ago our committee met 
with representatives of the Bureau of the 
Budget, General Accounting Office, Treas­
ury Department and Defense Department, 
and I was encouraged with the accomplish­
ments to date and the spirit with which 
this whole program was being pursued. Ob­
viously, the program will take a lot of time 
—it cannot be done overnight, but I am 
very hopeful about the eventual outcome.
In closing, I should like to pay tribute 
to the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. 
Herbert Hoover. He is a most remarkable 
man of tremendous capacity. It was amaz­
ing to see what an intimate knowledge he 
had of the problems we were dealing with, 
as well as the overall problems arising out 
of the functional organization of the entire 
Federal Government. He has made a great 
contribution toward better government.
* * *
(Continued from page 4)
“With respect to increasing knowledge 
about the effective development and utili­
zation of womanpower . . .
1. Universities, foundations, and gov­
ernment encourage and support re­
search dealing with the impact of the 
increased employment of women upon 
family life, the rearing of children, 
and the self-development of women; 
upon the process of occupational 
choice among both younger and older 
women; upon the prosperity of the 
economy and living standards; and 
upon the availability of volunteer 
workers for community service func­
tions
2. The Secretary of Labor initiate a com­
prehensive study of the maximum use 
which could be made of the actual and 
potential resources of womanpower 
in the event of a national emergency
3. The Secretary of Labor take the ini­
tiative in establishing a commission 
to review, in the light of recent 
changes in technology and the econ­
omy and in the composition of the 
female labor force, the consequences 
and adequacy of existing Federal and 
state laws which have a direct bear­
ing on the employment of women.”
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